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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the survey period the Sixth Circuit addressed a wide 
variety of procedural issues, ranging from the unsettled question 
of whether the citizenship of limited partners must be considered 
when the partnership is a party to a diversity action, I to whether 
an offending attorney's ability to pay a monetary sanction 
must be taken into account when making an award under Rule 
11.2 
t B.A. 1973, University of Michigan; J.D. 1977, Wayne State University 
School of Law; LL.M. 1982, Harvard Law School. Professor of Law, Detroit 
College of Law. 
1. SHR Ltd. Partnership v. Braun, 888 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1989). [Editor's 
Note: At the time this article went to print, the United States Supreme Court 
handed down Carden v. Arkoma Associates, _ U.S. _, 110 S. Ct. 1015 
(1990), a 5-4 decision holding that the citizenship of limited partners must be taken 
into account to determine whether diversity of citizenship exists among the parties. 
The Sixth Circuit's decision in SHR Ltd. Partnership is wholly consistent with the 
Carden decision.] 
2. Jackson v. Law Firm of O'Hara, Ruberg, Osborne & Taylor, 875 F.2d 
1224 (6th Cir. 1989). 
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II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
The Sixth Circuit issued two opinions on diversity jurisdic-
tion, one dealing with the domestic relations exception to 
diversity jurisdiction,3 and the other with whether the citizenship 
of limited partners must be considered when a diversity action 
is brought by a limited partnership.4 In view of an intercircuit 
conflict, this last question will require ultimate resolution by 
the U.S. Supreme Court. 
A. Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction 
In the domestic relations exception opinion, Drewes v. Ilnicki,s 
the plaintiff sued his former wife in the Northern District of 
Ohio alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
interference with employment stemming from the defendant's 
purported refusal to allow the plaintiff to exercise visitation 
rights secured in a state court divorce action.6 The plaintiff 
also alleged that the defendant had written and telephoned 
false statements to his employer. 7 The defendant answered and 
counterclaimed to recover arrearages in child support, alimony, 
and medical expenses.s The district court dismissed the entire 
action sua sponte, concluding that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction under the "domestic relations exception" to diversity 
jurisdiction,9 first announced by the Supreme Court in 1859.10 
In reversing the district court, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged 
the continued vitality of the domestic relations exception, II but 
determined that on the face of the pleadings filed in the present 
case it was not clear that the exception applied to either the 
plaintiff's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
and interference with employment or to the defendant's 
counterclaim for arrearages in alimony and child support. 12 
3. Drewes v. Ilnicki, 863 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1988). 
4. SHR Ltd. Partnership v. Braun, 888 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1989). 
5. 863 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1988). 
6. 863 F .2d at 470. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. See id. at 470-71. 
10. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582 (1859). 
11. 863 F.2d at 471. 
12. Id. at 471-72. 
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Citing a number of other court of appeals' opinions upholding 
the exercise of jurisdiction even when the claim has intra-family 
implications, I3 the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court 
could not decline jurisdiction merely because the tort action 
sprang from a former marital relationship.14 Provided that the 
determination of the claims filed in federal court does not 
require the court to resolve any of the ongoing divorce disputes 
(which may require a careful sifting of the claims in order to 
determine their true character), IS the district court must exercise 
diversity jurisdiction over the plaintiff's two tort claims. 16 
Conceding that the former wife's counterclaim presented a 
closer question,17 the court nevertheless concluded that on the 
face of the pleadings her counterclaim clearly did not involve 
"ongoing questions concerning the validity of the original divorce 
decree. "18 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded 
for full consideration by the district court. 19 
Although the domestic relations exception to diversity 
jurisdiction is not without its detractors,20 the exception received 
Supreme Court reaffirmation in 1988 in Thompson v. 
Thompson. 21 The Sixth Circuit's decision is entirely consistent 
with an approach of giving a narrow construction to an exception 
to an express grant of federal court subject matter jurisdiction, 
as should most judicially-created exceptions to congressionally 
authorized exercises of federal court subject matter jurisdiction.22 
13. Id. at 471, (citing McIntyre v. McIntyre, 771 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 
1985); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Jagiella v. Jagiella, 
647 F.2d 561, 565 (5th Cir. 1981». 
14. Id. at 472. 
15. Id. at 471. Ct. Rogers v. Janzen, 891 F.2d 95, 98 (5th Cir. 1989) (district 
court should decline jurisdiction where inquiry into allegations of sexual abuse of 
daughter will be required). 
16. 863 F.2d at 471-72. 
17. Id. at 472. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. See e.g., Wand, A Call for the Repudiation 0/ the Domestic Relations 
Exception to Federal Jurisdiction, 30 Vn.L. L. REv. 307 (1985); Rush, Domestic 
Relations Law: Federal Jurisdiction and State Sovereignty in Perspective, 60 NOTRE 
DAME L. REv. 1 (1984). See also Atwood, Domestic Relations in Federal Court: 
Toward a Principled Exercise 0/ Jurisdiction, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 571 (1984). 
21. 484 U.S. 174 (1988). 
22. See, e.g., Redish, Abstention, Separation 0/ Powers, and the Limits 0/ 
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Federal courts should only abstain in domestic relations cases 
where the relief sought clearly touches upon local problems 
peculiarly unsuited to control by federal courts, e.g., the grant 
of a divorce or the modification of a support or custody 
award.23 Notwithstanding the strong state interest in domestic 
relations matters, coupled with the competence of state courts 
in settling family disputes, a federal court should not stay its 
hand to hear a diversity action stemming from, but still outside 
of, the domestic relations core. The Sixth Circuit's decision 
in Drewes v. Ilnicki is consistent with this view. Conceding 
that it may be difficult to glean from the pleadings alone the 
true character of the dispute,24 the Sixth Circuit nevertheless 
cautioned that dismissal of an action at the pleadings stage 
may be premature if the dismissal is based on the domestic 
relations exception to diversity jurisdiction.25 
B. The Citizenship of Partnerships for Diversity Purposes 
In determining the citizenship of partnerships for diversity 
purposes, an unresolved question is whether the citizenship of 
the general partners alone is sufficient, or whether the citizenship 
of the limited partners must be considered as well. The circuits 
are split on this question.26 With its decision in SHR Limited 
Partnership v. Braun,27 the Sixth Circuit joins the Third, Fourth, 
Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that the 
the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984); Zeigler, A Reassessment of the 
Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 DUKE 
L.J. 987. 
23. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859). See C. WRIGHT, THE 
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 143-44 (4th ed. 1983) [hereinafter C. WRIGHT); Note, 
Application of the Federal Abstention Doctrines to the Domestic Relations Exception 
to Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1095. 
24. Drewes, 863 F.2d at 471. 
25. [d. at 472. 
26. Compare New York Teachers Retirement Sys. v. Kalkus, 764 F.2d 1015 
(4th Cir. 1985) (no diversity jurisdiction) with Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & 
Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966) (diversity jurisdiction present), cert. denied, 385 
U.S. 817 (1966). [Editor's Note: The United States Supreme Court resolved this 
intercircuit conflict after this article went to print in Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 
__ U.S. _, 110 S. Ct. 1015 (1990). See supra note 1). 
27. 888 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1989). 
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citizenship of limited partners is to be considered in cases 
invoking the district court's diversity jurisdiction.28 
In SHR Limited Partnership, a limited partnership brought 
a diversity action seeking an accounting from, and removal 
of, defendants as trust managers.29 All the defendants were 
Michigan domiciliaries; the general partners were non-Michigan 
domiciliaries; and some of the limited partners were Michigan 
domiciliaries.30 After denying the defendants' motion to dismiss 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court certified 
the issue for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 
1292(b), and the Sixth Circuit granted the defendants' motion 
for leave to appeal the district court's order.3! 
The court began its discussion by noting the split of authority 
on this question. 32 The first line of decisions from the Second 
and Fifth Circuits33 adopts a "real party to the controversy" 
test under which diversity jurisdiction is not defeated by the 
citizenship of limited partners if the general partners possess 
the exclusive authority to manage the business assets and to 
control all litigation.34 The rationale for this view is that under 
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act limited partners are largely 
prevented from participating in actions by, or against, the 
partnership.3s Therefore, only general partners may be considered 
"the real parties to the controversy.' '36 
. Observing that the Supreme Court has consistently rejected 
the suggestion that unincorporated associations be treated the 
same as corporations for diversity purposes,37 and surveying 
those circuits which consider limited partners' citizenship for 
diversity purposes,38 the Sixth Circuit adopted the bright-line 
28. SHR Ltd. Partnership v. Braun, 888 F.2d 455, 459 (6th Cir. 1989). 
29. Id. at 455-56. 
30. Id. at 456. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 797 
F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1986); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966). 
34. See SHR Ltd. Partnership, 888 F.2d at 456-57. 
35. See id. at 457. 
36. See id. 
37. SHR Ltd. Partnership, 888 F.2d at 457. 
38. Id. at 458-59. 
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rule followed in those circuits that have addressed this question 
by holding that the citizenship of each limited partner must 
be considered when determining diversity jurisdiction.39 Believing 
that this rule is truer to Supreme Court precedent in the area ,40 
the Sixth Circuit added that the rule "enables parties and 
counsel contemplating litigation involving a limited partnership 
to determine readily whether a limited partner's citizenship will 
preclude diversity jurisdiction .... Judicial economy is thereby 
promoted. "41 
Against a backdrop of Supreme Court decisions refusing to 
treat unincorporated associations as a single entity for diversity 
purposes, the Sixth Circuit can hardly be faulted for joining 
the ranks of the five other circuits that have included the 
citizenship of limited partners for diversity purposes. The Court's 
opinion is open to criticism, however, insofar as it is driven 
by considerations of judicial economy, specifically, avoidance 
of an evidentiary hearing on the threshold issue of jurisdiction.42 
Take the situation, for example, where a limited partnership 
decides to bring suit. Assuming the accuracy of partnership 
records,43 counsel for a limited partnership should be able to 
determine the residence address of all limited partners. But 
physical presence in a state only meets half the test of citizenship 
for diversity purposes.44 Present intent to remain in that place 
must also be satisfied,45 and that question cannot be answered 
definitively without making specific inquiry of each limited 
partner into such factors as, for example, place of employment, 
voter registration, car registration, and location of bank 
accounts.46 Given the highly mobile character of American 
39. [d. at 458-59. 
40. [d. at 459. 
41. [d. at 458. 
42. See id. at 459. 
43. Although § 2 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act requires a certificate 
of formation containing the name and place of residence of each member, this 
information is not sufficient to answer definitively what the citizenship is of a 
given limited partner. 
44. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 146. 
45. [d.; 13B C. WRIGHT, A. Mn.LER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3612 at 530-33 (1984) [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE]. 
46. C. WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 146; FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 
supra note 45, at 530-33. 
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society, a limited partner's citizenship for diversity purposes 
may change over the duration of the partnership. If counsel 
for a limited partnership concludes that one or more limited 
partners is not diverse from one or more target defendants, 
counsel will file her lawsuit in state court. If counsel concludes 
that complete diversity exists, she may elect to file in federal 
court. But counsel's conclusion either way is no guarantee that 
defense counsel will neither remove the state action to federal 
court in order to test the diversity issue nor launch an attack 
challenging subject matter jurisdiction if the limited partners 
file their action originally in federal court. Either scenario may 
lead to an evidentiary hearing on the citizenship of one or 
more limited partners. 
Conversely, when a limited partnership is sued, the plaintiff 
may be unable to determine after reasonable inquiry whether 
all limited partners are diverse, even if plaintiff has been in 
regular contact with the partnership and has ready access to 
its records (as would a trustee). Most plaintiffs suing a lhnited 
partnership will be unable to determine whether complete 
diversity exists until after suit is filed and an evidentiary hearing 
held. 
In short, the rule adopted by the Sixth Circuit in SHR 
Limited Partnership merits commendation in terms of its ease 
of application compared with the competing "real party to 
the controversy" test. However, whether its adoption will obviate 
the necessity of an evidentiary hearing on the threshold issue 
of jurisdiction, as suggested by the Sixth Circuit, is debatable. 
C. Civil Rights Removal 
In the aftermath of the Civil War there was great distrust 
in the ability or willingness of Southern courts to protect the 
civil rights of the newly freed slaves.47 One congressional response 
was the enactment of the Civil Rights Removal Act, 28 U.S.C. 
section 1443, intended to prevent the use of state courts as 
47. See M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF 
JUDICIAL POWER 375-82 (1989) [hereinafter M. REDISH); Amsterdam, Criminal 
Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and 
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 
823-24 (1965) [hereinafter Amsterdam, Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Ju-
risdiction ). 
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instruments of harassment against blacks48 by permitting a state 
court defendant to remove civil actions or criminal prosecutions 
to the more sympathetic federal court if it can be shown that 
those state suits are: 
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the 
courts of such State a right under any law providing for the equal 
civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within 
the jurisdiction thereof; 
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law 
providing for equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the 
ground that it would be inconsistent with such law. 49 
In Conrad v. Robinson,5o the Sixth Circuit examined the 
applicability of section 1443(1) in an appeal challenging the 
district court's sua sponte dismissal of a libel action brought 
in Ohio common pleas court and removed pursuant to section 
1443(1).5\ The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the action 
had been properly removed. 52 
Robinson had filed a civil rights lawsuit against his union, 
the Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-
CIO Local 496 (Local 496), under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964,53 alleging that he had been removed from his 
position as a union steward and eventually laid off in retaliation 
for his attempts to fight an alleged policy of Local 496 limiting 
minority membership.54 Following settlement of this federal 
court action, Robinson gave an interview to the Cleveland 
Plain Dealer in which he stated that "Floyd Conrad, Local 
496 business agent, . . . said something about me not being 
on the team any longer and that he would get me fired .... "55 
48. M. REDISH, supra note 47, at 375-82; Amsterdam, Federal Removal and 
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, supra note 47, at 823-24. 
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1), (2) (1982). For an overview of the Civil Rights 
Removal Act, see E. CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 579-92 (1989)[hereinafter 
CHEMERINSKY]. 
50. 871 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1989). 
51. [d. at 613. 
52. [d. at 616. The Sixth Circuit noted that the district court should have 
ordered remand rather than dismissal of the case, but that in light of the court's 
reversal of the district court, no action was needed to correct that particular error. 
[d. at 613 n.1. 
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). 
54. 871 F.2d at 613. 
55. [d. at 613 n.3. 
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Over one year later, Conrad brought a libel action in state 
court against Robinson, alleging that Robinson had accused 
him of practicing racial discrimination in the Plain Dealer 
article. 56 In his removal petition Robinson contended that 
Conrad's motive for filing the libel action was to retaliate 
against Robinson for engaging in protected activity under federal 
civil rights law, specifically filing the Title VII action and 
encouraging other blacks to join Local 496. 57 Robinson added 
that his defense of retaliation could not be raised in the Ohio 
court action because under Ohio law Ohio courts lack jurisdiction 
over Title VII actions. 58 
The Sixth Circuit had little difficulty in finding that the 
district court erred in its analysis. The district court applied 
the Mottley "well-pleaded complaint" rule59 as the appropriate 
standard for determining whether the action was properly 
removable, thus focusing on the complaint rather than on 
defenses to it to see whether a federal question was presented.6O 
While the district court's analysis would have been proper had 
removal been requested under 28 U.S.C. section 1441(b) (the 
general federal question removal statute), removal in this case 
was requested pursuant to section 1443(1), "a very special 
statute to deal with specific and discrete problems involving 
removal of cases, civil or criminal, in which the defendant 
cannot enforce his claim of civil rights in the state court. "61 
Rather than looking to the claims of the plaintiff to determine 
whether the case is properly removable, section 1443(1) instead 
looks to the civil rights claims of the defendant to answer that 
question. 
Applying a two-pronged test developed by the Supreme Court 
to determine whether a case is properly removable under section 
1443(1), the Sixth Circuit concluded that Robinson had met 
his burden of establishing that removal was proper. 62 The first 
56. [d. at 613. 
57. [d. at 613-14. 
58. [d. at 614 (citing Fox v. Eaton Corp., 48 Ohio St. 2d 236, 358 N.E.2d 
536 (1976». 
59. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911). 
60. 871 F.2d at 614. 
61. [d. at 614. 
62. [d. at 614-16. 
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inquiry asks whether "the right denied defendant arises 
under a federal law that provides for specific civil rights stated 
in terms of racial equality. "63 Here, Robinson clearly met the 
first step of the test since his allegation of retaliation for his 
protests against racial discrimination is conduct expressly 
prohibited by 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-3, a civil rights law 
under section 1443.64 The second step of the test requires that 
the right in question be one that cannot be enforced in state 
court.6S In answering this question, the court must look at the 
acts of the defendant at issue to see if they constituted or 
were tied to protected activity. 66 The Sixth Circuit concluded 
that the statements made by Robinson that were the subject 
of Conrad's complaint, even though themselves not the protected 
activity, were closely tied to Robinson's engaging in activity 
protected by Title VII.67 Coupled with the fact that Robinson's 
claim of retaliatory motivation prohibited by Title VII could 
not be heard by an Ohio state court, the Sixth Circuit concluded 
that Robinson had satisfied the second step of the Supreme 
Court's two-part test.68 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit reversed 
and remanded with instructions to reinstate the case on the 
district court's docket. 69 
Despite the Supreme Court's begrudging construction of 
section 1443(1), which has led one commentator to observe 
"the privilege promised by the civil rights removal statute has 
become relatively moribund,' '70 the Sixth Circuit nevertheless 
gave section 1443(1) a sympathetic reading in extending it to 
the facts of Conrad v. Robinson. In meeting the second-prong 
of the Supreme Court's two-part test for removal under section 
1443(1), the petitioner must usually show the existence of a 
63. [d. at 614-15 (citing Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213 (1975); City of 
Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 
(1966». 
64. 871 F.2d at 615. 
65. [d. 
66. [d. 
67. [d. at 615-16. 
68. [d, at 616. 
69. [d. at 614, 616. 
70. See Dittman, Removal in Civil Rights Cases Under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(2), 
31 LOYOLA L. REv. 855, 888 (1986). For other criticisms of the Supreme Court's 
narrow interpretation of § 1443(1), see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 49, at 584. 
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specific state statute or constitutional provision that will lead 
to the denial of his rights in state court.71 Although there was 
no such Ohio statute or constitutional provision present in this 
case, the Sixth Circuit still concluded that removal was proper. 
Its decision is to be applauded for having the salutary effect 
of helping to revitalize an otherwise "moribund" civil rights 
statute.72 
III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
In Third National Bank in Nashville v. WEDGE Group 
Inc. ,73 the Sixth Circuit was asked to decide whether defendant 
WEDGE Group had sufficient minimum contacts with the state 
of Tennessee to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over it in a diversity action,14 In diversity cases a federal court 
applies the law of the state in which it sits to determine whether 
it has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. 7S The 
Tennessee long-arm statute provides for the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants on "[a]ny basis not 
inconsistent with the constitution of this state or of the United 
States, "76 thus reducing all personal jurisdiction questions to 
a single due process inquiry. 77 The Sixth Circuit acknowledged 
that WEDGE Group's contacts with Tennessee were not sub-
stantial, and that any exercise of general personal jurisdiction78 
would therefore be violative of due process.79 Applying its 
71. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 219 (1975). 
72. See Redish, Revitalizing Civil Rights Removal Jurisdiction, 64 MINN. L. 
REv. 523 (1980). 
73. 882 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1989). 
74. Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. WEDGE Group, 882 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 
1989). 
75. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(e). 
76. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-214(6) (1980). 
77. See Masada Investment Corp. v. Allen, 697 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tenn. 1985). 
78. In Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), 
the Supreme Court explained that "[wJhen a State exercises personal jurisdiction 
over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts 
with the forum, the State has been said to be exercising 'general jurisdiction' over 
the defendant." 466 U.S. at 414 n.9. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due 
Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 S. CT. REv. 77, 80-81; von 
Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. 
L. REv. 1121, 1136-44 (1966). 
79. Third Nat'l Bank, 882 F.2d at 1089. 
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three-part test for determining whether personal jurisdiction 
may be exercised in a given case, the Court nevertheless found 
sufficient contacts with Tennessee to warrant the exercise of 
specific jurisdiction80 over WEDGE Group,81 and reversed the 
district court's order of dismissal for lack of personal juris-
diction. 82 
Plaintiff Third National Bank in Nashville had extended 
loans of forty-two million dollars over a four-year period to 
The Rogers Companies (TRC), a construction firm with its 
principal place of business in Tennessee and wholly owned by 
WEDGE Group, a Delaware corporation with its principal 
place of business in Texas.83 WEDGE Group officers served 
as TRC directors and met regularly in Tennessee to review 
and direct TRC operations. 84 The two companies entered into 
a tax sharing agreement that provided for an equitable sharing 
of each company's federal income tax burden.8s WEDGE Group 
officers participated in loan negotiations between TRC and 
Third National Bank, and agreed to make a capital contribution 
to TRC of $7.5 million, which WEDGE deposited with Third 
National. 86 TRC eventually defaulted on its loan obligations 
to Third National, forcing Third National to file a diversity 
action against WEDGE to enforce TRC's rights under the tax 
sharing agreement. 87 
Distilling Supreme Court jurisprudence on the subject of 
personal jurisdiction from International ShoeB8 to Burger King,89 
the Sixth Circuit has established a three-pronged test for de-
80. In Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), 
the Supreme Court reported that "[ilt has been said that when a State exercises 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the 
defendant's contacts with the forum, the" State is exercising 'specific jurisdiction' 
over the defendant." 466 U.S. at 414 n.8. See von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction 
to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1144-64 (1966). 
81. 882 F.2d at 1089-90. 
82. Id. at 1087. 
83. Id. at 1088. 
84. Id.l 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
89. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
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termining whether the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction 
is appropriate in a particular case: 
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege 
of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum 
state. Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant's 
activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences 
caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection 
with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the 
defendant reasonable.90 
Applying these three factors to the facts of Third National 
Bank, the Sixth Circuit found that specific jurisdiction existed 
over WEDGE Group in Tennessee.91 First, in view of WEDGE's 
active participation in the business affairs of TRC, its regular 
trips to Tennessee to oversee the TRC operations, and its 
participation in the loan agreement negotiations between TRC 
and Third National, the Sixth Circuit had "no hesitancy in 
concluding that, by these actions and contacts, WEDGE 'pur-
posefully availed' itself of acting and causing consequences in 
Tennessee .... "92 Second, given that the operative facts of 
the controversy were related to WEDGE's contacts with Ten-
nessee, the court was satisfied that Third National's cause of 
action against WEDGE to enforce its rights under its security 
agreement with TRC had a substantial connection with 
WEDGE's contacts with Tennessee.93 Turning finally to the 
question of whether exercising jurisdiction under these circum-
stances would be reasonable, the Sixth Circuit was convinced 
that no sufficiently compelling countervailing interests existed 
that outweighed Tennessee's legitimate interest in providing a 
forum for the adjudication of a dispute between a resident 
and nonresident.94 To the extent Texas has an interest in the 
dispute, the court suggested that that interest could be accom-
modated by the application of Texas law to the resolution of 
90. Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Indus., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 
1968). 
91. 882 F.2d at 1087. 
92. Id. at 1090. 
93. Id. at 1091. 
94. Id. at 1092. 
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the controversy.95 In sum, notwithstanding that WEDGE never 
directly conducted business, held title to property, or retained 
employees in Tennessee, it was nonetheless amenable to suit 
there. 
The Sixth Circuit's analysis and conclusion are entirely in 
step with International Shoe and its progeny, and in that respect 
Third National Bank is unremarkable. Of note, however, is 
Judge Keith's concurring opinion in which he urged that a 
different analysis should be used for determining when juris-
diction may be properly asserted through the parent-subsidiary 
relationship.96 He would streamline the analysis by building on 
the Sixth Circuit's decision in Velandra v. Regie Nationale Des 
Usines Renault,97 where the court ruled that when the corporate 
separation is fictitious, jurisdiction may be properly obtained 
through the parent-subsidiary relationship.98 Updating that rule, 
Judge Keith would hold that jurisdiction exists over a foreign 
parent corporation by virtue of jurisdiction over the local 
subsidiary if (1) " 'the absent parent instigated the subsidiary's 
local activities,' " or (2) " 'the absent parent and the subsidiary 
are in fact a single legal entity.' "99 Terming the former "at-
tribution" and the latter "merger,"IOO Judge Keith would have 
found that WEDGE failed to maintain a separate corporate 
identity from TRC and effectively consummated a merger with 
TRC.lOl Consequently, traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice would not be offended by holding WEDGE 
accountable in Tennessee for TRC's conduct there. 102 
Judge Keith's alternative analysis in the corporate parent-
subsidiary setting has the appeal of rejecting formalism in 
favor of functionalism. There is a certain artificiality in many 
analyses that attempt to distinguish a corporate parent from 
its subsidiary. Jurisdiction over parent or subsidiary should be 
possible in the forum state whenever the parent and subsidiary 
95. [d. 
96. Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. WEDGE Group, 882 F.2d 1087, 1092 
(6th Cir. 1989) (Keith, J., concurring). 
97. 336 F.2d 292, 297 (6th Cir. 1964). 
98. [d. at 296. 
99. 882 F.2d at 1094 (Keith, J., concurring) (quoting Brilmayer & Paisley, 
Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, 
and Agency, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 12 (1986». 
100. 882 F.2d at 1094. 
101. [d. 
102. [d. 
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comprise a single functional economic entity, and either entity 
engages in forum activities that give rise to the action for 
which the entity is being sued. 
IV. THE REFUSAL TO ASSERT JURISDICTION 
Even when a federal court is vested with subject matter 
jurisdiction over an action and personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant, court-fashioned doctrines of judicial restraint may 
counsel against the exercise of that jurisdiction. Two of these 
doctrines are forum non conveniens and abstention, both of 
which were considered by the Sixth Circuit during the survey 
period. 
A. Younger Abstention 
In another civil rights case decided during the survey period, 
Litteral v. Bach,103 the plaintiff brought an action in federal 
court alleging a violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 
section 1985. The plaintiff was sued in Kentucky state court 
for back rent owed on business premises. Following a bench 
trial, judgment was entered against her. Litteral paid the back 
rent and filed an appeal. Under a Kentucky state statute,I04 
all further proceedings are stayed upon satisfaction of the 
judgment and timely filing of notice of appeal. Nevertheless, 
Judge Bach, who presided at the trial, signed a writ of restitution, 
ordered Litteral to deposit with the court $450.00 per month 
in rent pending the appeal, and further ordered that if she 
failed to make the deposit, her lessors could pursue their 
warrant of restitution for possession of the leased premises. 105 
Litteral thereafter filed her section 1985 action in federal court, 
alleging a conspiracy to deprive her of her civil rights and 
seeking compensatory and punitive damages. 106 The district 
court abstained from taking jurisdiction of the action, concluding 
that the three-prong abstention test of Younger v. Harris lO7 
103. 869 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1989). 
104. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 383.255(1) (Baldwin 1985). 
105. Litteral, 869 F.2d at 298. 
106. [d. at 298. 
107. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
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had been satisfied. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed in a 
per curiam opinion. 108 J 
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis with an overview of 
Younger and its progeny, 109 noting that although the Younger 
abstention doctrine had initially been limited to state criminal 
and quasi-criminal proceedings, it now extends to state civil 
proceedings if three factors are present: (l) there must be 
ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) those proceedings must 
involve an important state interest; and (3) the state proceedings 
must afford the federal plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to 
raise her federal constitutional claims.110 Applying this test to 
the facts of Litteral, the Sixth Circuit concluded that abstention 
was not warranted because the pending state litigation did not 
involve a vital state interest. 111 Moreover, the court added, 
because Litteral's claim for money damages could not be 
addressed in the pending state proceedings, the district court's 
dismissal was in error ll2 under the authority of Deakins v. 
Monaghan. 113 
In Litteral, the Sixth Circuit gave the term, "an important 
state interest," a narrow application, fortunately avoiding any 
broad principle of federal judicial noninterference with state 
judicial proceedings. Regrettably, it is difficult to know ex ante 
what constitutes "an important state interest" warranting 
dismissal, absent some guidance from the federal appellate 
courts. Even though the court was conclusory in stating that 
no vital state interest was at stake in this case, and did not 
explain what is "an important state interest," sound judicial 
decision-making probably counsels against broad 
pronouncements on what constitutes an important state interest. 
108. 869 F.2d at 298. 
109. For a discussion of the Younger abstention doctrine, see generally Redish, 
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 
YALE L.J. 71 (1984); Shaman & Turkington, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.: The Federal 
Courthouse Door Closes Further, 56 B.V.L. REv. 907 (1976); Zeigler, Federal Court 
Reform of State Criminal Justice Systems: A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine 
from a Modern Perspective, 19 V.C. DAVIS L. REv. 31 (1985). 
110. 869 F.2d 299 (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar 
Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982». 
Ill. Id. at 299. 
112. Id. at 300. 
113.484 U.S. 193, 204 (1988). 
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Even so, this is cold comfort for the lower federal courts and 
the civil rights litigants who will have to get their answer to 
this question on a case-by-case basis. 
B. Forum Non Conveniens 
In Stewart v. Dow Chemical Co., 114 citizens of New Brunswick, 
Canada, brought a diversity action against Dow Chemical 
alleging dioxin poisoning from a herbicide produced by Dow. 1I5 
Dow moved to dismiss on a number of grounds, including 
that of forum non conveniens. 1I6 The district court granted 
Dow's motion to dismiss, conditioning the dismissal on the 
following: (1) that Dow consent to Canadian jurisdiction and 
accept service of process; (2) that Dow waive any statute of 
limitations defense; (3) that Dow make all the witnesses under 
its control available for testimony in Canada; (4) that Dow 
allow discovery in the Canadian courts of any materials which 
would be available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 
and (5) that Dow pay any judgment entered, subject to its 
right to appeal under Canadian law.117 Dow stipulated to these 
five conditions and the district court thereafter dismissed. liS 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed."9 Noting that the 
standard of appellate review is' abuse of discretion by the trial 
court, the Sixth Circuit addressed the public and private interest 
factors that a court is to consider on a forum non conveniens 
dismissal motion,12O citing the two leading Supreme Court 
decisions on this subject, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,121 and 
Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert. 122 The Court begap its analysis remarking 
that although a plaintiff's choice of forum is to be given 
substantial deference, where a plaintiff is a foreigner, such as 
114. 865 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1989). 
115. Stewart v. Dow Chern. Co., 865 F.2d 103, 104 (6th Cir. 1989). 
116. [d. at 104. 
117. [d. at 104-05. 
118. [d. at 105. 
119. [d. at 104. 
120. [d. at 105-06. 
121. 454 U.S. 235 (1981). See generally Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non 
Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REv. I (1929); Comment, Forum 
Non Conveniens and American Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts, 47 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 373 (1980). 
122. 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
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Stewart, that choice is entitled to less deference because 
convenience of the forum selected cannot be presumed. 123 
Because an adequate alternative forum existed in Canada, and 
because both of the parties were prepared to proceed in a 
court in a foreign jurisdiction (thus eliminating inconvenience 
as an issue), the Sixth Circuit saw no error in the trial court's 
weighing of the public interest factors or in the conditions 
imposed on dismissal. 124 Turning to an examination of the 
private interest factors - ease of access to proofs, availability 
of compulsory process, the cost of witness attendance125 - the 
Sixth Circuit again found no abuse of discretion in ordering 
dismissal, considering that most evidence and witnesses would 
be located in New Brunswick. 126 
The Stewart decision typifies the nearly complete deference 
accorded district court rulings on forum non conveniens 
motions. 127 The opinion is potentially controversial, however, 
because of its blanket approval without discussion of the five 
conditions imposed by the district court in granting the motion 
to dismiss. With the exception of the fourth condition - that 
Dow allow discovery in the Canadian court of any materials 
that would be available under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure - these conditions are unexceptional in forum non 
conveniens dismissals. 128 However, in In re Union Carbide Corp. 
Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal,129 the Second Circuit rejected 
the imposition of the same discovery condition in the district 
court's dismissal for forum non conveniens.I3O The Second 
Circuit explained that "[b]asic justice dictates that both sides 
be treated equally, with each having equal access to the evidence 
in the possession or under control of the other." 131 There, 
123. 865 F.2d at 106 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 
(1981». 
124. Id. at 106-07. 
125. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508. 
126. 865 F.2d at 107. 
127. See Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 748-54 
(1982) (discussing Supreme Court decisions requiring virtually complete deference 
to lower court rulings on forum non conveniens). 
128. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 105 (1985). 
129. 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987). 
130. 809 F.2d at 205. 
131. Id. 
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Union Carbide objected to the imposition of this unilateral 
discovery condition as being unfair .132 Here, by contrast, Dow 
unconditionally stipulated to this discovery condition and made 
no challenge to it on appeal. Consequently, it was left standing 
by the Sixth Circuit. 
v. OFFER OF JUDGMENT 
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
m part that: 
[A] party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse 
party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against the defending 
party for the money or property ... specified in the offer, with 
costs then accrued. . . . An offer not accepted shall be deemed 
withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a pro-
ceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the 
offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay 
the costs incurred after the making of the offer. . . . f33 
The effect of Rule 68 is to permit a defendant to make a 
formal settlement offer, which the plaintiff may accept or 
reject. If the plaintiff rejects the offer, and then obtains a 
judgment for less than the offered amount, the plaintiff is 
precluded from recovering her own costs and must also pay 
the defendant's costs incurred after the offer. 134 Are attorneys' 
fees part of the "costs" that are shifted to the plaintiff? May 
the defendant recover his post-offer costs if he, rather than 
the plaintiff, gets a judgment? The Supreme Court answered 
the first question in the affirmative when the underlying statute 
(there, 42 U .S.C. section 1988) defines "costs" to include 
attorneys' fees, concluding in Marek v. Chesney,135 that contrary 
to the American rule against fee shifting, Rule 68 "costs" 
may include attorneys' fees.136 The Supreme Court answered 
the second question in the negative in Delta Air Lines, Inc. 
132. [d. at 201-02. 
133. FED. R. CIv. P. 68. 
134. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3001-
3005 (1973). 
135. 473 U.S. 1 (1985). 
136. [d. at 9. 
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v. August,137 holding that on a literal reading of Rule 68, a 
defendant may recover its post-offer costs under Rule 68 only 
when the plaintiff recovers a judgment in an amount less than 
that offered by the defendant, but greater than zero dollars. 138 
During the survey period, the Sixth Circuit had the oppor-
tunity to consider both of these Supreme Court decisions. In 
Oates v. Oates,139 the defendant made an offer of judgment 
pursuant to Rule 68 for $4,000, plus payment of "all court 
costs," in an action for damages alleging violations of the 
wiretapping provisions of Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. sections 2511 
and 2520. 140 The plaintiffs accepted the offer and thereafter 
attempted to recover attorney's fees as part of their court 
costS.141 The narrow question· presented for the Sixth Circuit's 
review was whether 18 U.S.C. section 2520 defines attorney's 
fees as a part of "costS."142 If the statute does, then under 
the authority of Marek v. Chesney, those fees are included as 
costs for purposes of Rule 68. The Sixth Circuit concluded 
that the underlying statute does not permit an award of fees 
as part of Rule 68 costs and affirmed the district court's denial 
of a fee award. 143 
The defendant and his lawyer allegedly tapped telephone 
conversations of defendant's wife and another party during 
the pendency of a divorce action.l44 After accepting the offer 
of settlement, plaintiffs moved to recover attorney's fees as 
part of their Rule 68 costs. Plaintiffs argued that the plain 
meaning of 18 U.S.C. section 2520145 includes attorney's fees 
137. 450 u.s. 346 (1981). 
138. [d. at 351-52. 
139. 866 F.2d 203 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3163 (1989). 
140. [d. at 204. 
141. [d. 
142. [d. 
143. [d. at 206-08. 
144. [d. at 204. 
145. That section provides in part: 
Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, 
or used in violation of this chapter shall . . . (2) be entitled to recover 
from any such person - (a) actual damages ... ; (b) punitive damages; 
and (c) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably 
incurred. 
18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1982). 
HeinOnline -- 1990 Det. C.L. Rev. 325 1990
1990] Civil Procedure 325 
as costs for purposes of Rule 68. 146 Unlike section 1988, which, 
as construed by the Supreme Court in Marek, provides for an 
award of "reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs," 
the Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court's construction 
of section 2520 as providing for attorney's fees as part of 
recoverable damages, and that such fees were subsumed under 
the offer of judgment. 147 Conceding that the question was a 
close one, the Sixth Circuit nevertheless believed that as a 
policy matter, the American rule precluding attorney fee shifting 
should be followed' 'unless the underlying statute clearly defines 
attorney's fees as an additional component of traditional 'costs' 
.... [W]e hold that attorney's fees are not 'costs' for purposes 
of Rule 68."148 
The Oates decision is squarely in line with the Supreme 
Court's admonition in Alyeska Pipe Line,149 that "absent statute 
or an enforceable contract, litigants pay their own attorneys' 
fees. "ISO Awarding attorneys' fees is an exceptional remedy. 
As the Sixth Circuit recognized in another appeal decided during 
the survey period, "[a]bsent such explicit [congressional] au-
thorization, federal courts may exercise their inherent powers 
to tax attorneys' fees only in the narrowly defined circum-
stances" of bad faith, willful disobedience of a court order, 
and the common fund doctrine. 151 Because none of those cir-
cumstances existed in Oates, the court was correct in rejecting 
plaintiffs' contention. 
The Supreme Court's Delta Air Lines and Marek decisions 
converged into a second Rule 68 opinion decided during the 
survey period, Hopper v. Euclid Manor Nursing Home, Inc. ls2 
In Hopper, plaintiff sued her employer for terminating her in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
146. 866 F.2d at 205. 
147. [d. at 205-07. 
148. [d. at 208. For another opinion issued during the survey period rejecting 
a construction of Rule 68 as permitting an award of attorney's fees as part of 
costs, see Zackaroff v. Koch Transfer Co., 878 F.2d 387 (6th Cir. 1988). 
149. Alyeska Pipe Line Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
150. [d. at 257. 
151. Tiede! v. Northwestern Michigan College, 865 F.2d 88, 92-93 (6th Cir. 
1988). 
152. 867 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1989). 
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U.S.C. section 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. section 1981.153 The nurs-
ing home made an offer of judgment of $750.00, which Hopper 
rejected. ls4 At a bench trial the district court rejected all but 
one of plaintiff's claims and awarded her nominal damages 
of $100.00 for the section 1981 violation. ISS At a post-trial 
hearing both parties requested an award of costs. Under the 
authority of Marek, Rule 68 costs include attorneys' fees in 
a civil rights case. Because Hopper failed to get judgment in 
an amount in excess of the offer of judgment, the district 
court reluctantly agreed that the nursing home was entitled to 
attorneys' fees as part of its Rule 68 costS.IS6 Shortly thereafter, 
the district court vacated its judgment sua sponte pursuant to 
Rule 60(b)(6) and entered judgment for the nursing home to 
negate the effect of the Delta Air Lines decision, of which 
the district court had been previously unaware. IS7 The nursing 
home challenged the district court's action as an abuse of 
discretion. ISS 
Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief from a judgment for "any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." IS9 
The Sixth Circuit adheres to the view that relief under Rule 
60(b)(6) is extraordinary, and the court here found no ex-
traordinary or exceptional circumstances warranting Rule 
60(b)(6) relief. l60 More importantly, the Sixth Circuit stated: 
To allow the trial judge to change his evaluation of the merits of 
a claim based upon the belated discovery of a rejected offer of 
judgment would undermine Rule 68's purpose of forcing plaintiffs 
to "think very hard" before proceeding with their suits .... [A]ny 
power retained by the district court to change his evaluation of 
the case in order to avoid application of Rule 68 seriously un-
dermines the goal of unbiased evaluation of the merits of cases 
and lessens the possibility for settlement. 161 
153. [d. at 293. 
154. [d. at 293. 
155. [d. 
156.' [d. 
157. [d. 
158. [d. at 294. 
159. FED. R. CIV. P. 6O(b)(6). 
160. [d. 
161. [d. at 295 (quoting Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. at 11). 
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With victory in its grasp, the defendant in Hopper had it 
snatched away at the very end. Because Rule 68 does not, in 
and of itself, provide for an award of attorneys' fees, the 
nursing home, according to the Sixth Circuit, was entitled to 
attorneys' fees under Rule 68 only to the extent that an award 
of such fees was made under 42 U.S.C. section 1988. 162 Here, 
the district court had refused to award the defendant its at-
torneys' fees under section 1988, and the defendant did not 
appeal the district court's denial. 163 Accordingly, the Sixth 
Circuit expressed no opinion concerning the propriety of the 
district court's decision in that respect. l64 
Besides making it clear that the operation of Rule 68 is 
mandatory, and at times harsh, the Hopper opinion sends a 
clear message to appellants that failing to appeal an issue can 
also have severe consequences. The lesson to appealing parties 
is to be thorough when raising issues on appeal. 165 
VI. RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
During the survey period, the Sixth Circuit had the oppor-
tunity to determine the propriety of Rule 11 sanctions in three 
appeals. l66 In In re Summers,167 the Sixth Circuit reversed the 
district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions in a case orig-
inally filed in state court, removed to federal court, and sub-
sequently voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(I).I68 In 
162. Id. at 296. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. The Sixth Circuit sent a similar message in Heussner v. National Gypsum 
Co., 887 F.2d 672 (6th Cir. 1989), decided during the survey period, where the 
Sixth Circuit granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all of the parties to the 
appeal except the named plaintiff Heussner because the plaintiffs failed to specify 
in their notice of appeal the parties taking the appeal, but instead used the designation 
"et al." in their notice of appeal. Id. at 675. The Sixth Circuit relied on the 
Supreme Court's decision in Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 108 S. Ct. 2405 
(1988), which held that the federal appellate courts lack jurisdiction over any party 
who is not specified in the notice of appeal in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 
3(c). Id. at 675. 
166. For a discussion of Rule 11, see generally G. SHREVE & P. RAVEN-HANSEN, 
UNDERSTANDING CIvIL PROCEDURE § 48[B] (1989), where the authors discuss and 
cite several articles treating Rule 11. 
167. 863 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1988). 
168. In re Summers, 863 F.2d 20, 21 (6th Cir. 1988). 
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a case of first impression in the Sixth Circuit, the court followed 
the rule adopted in the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits 
that "where a complaint is properly filed in state court and 
then removed to federal court, it is inappropriate for the federal 
court to apply Rule 11 sanctions for the filing of that com-
plaint. "169 Without disputing that the defendant had been put 
to the burden and expense of defending against this lawsuit, 
the Sixth Circuit reminded the defendant that nothing prevented 
it from seeking sanctions in an Ohio state court. 170 
In a second Rule 11 opinion, Davis v. Crush,171 the Sixth 
Circuit again reversed the district court's imposition of Rule 
11 sanctions, on this occasion because the civil rights complaint 
filed by plaintiffs did not necessarily reflect a lack of reasonable 
inquiry into the facts or the law. 172 Two anti-abortion protesters, 
Davis and Johnson, were arrested for violating a state court 
preliminary injunction that had imposed time, place, and man-
ner restrictions on picketers' activities outside of a Planned 
Parenthood center in Cincinnati. 173 After their arrest, Davis 
and Johnson filed a section 1983 civil rights action in federal 
court against several state judicial and executive officials, al-
leging a conspiracy among the officials and Planned Parenthood 
to deprive them of their civil rights. 174 The district court dis-
missed the action under the authority of the Supreme Court's 
Younger decision, and on the basis that the state judge enjoyed 
absolute immunity from damages for his official actions. 175 
Shortly after dismissing the complaint the district court heard 
the defendants' Rule 11 motion and imposed a $2,500 Rule 
11 sanction, finding that, because various state remedies were 
available, the section 1983 action was intended to harass and 
that assertions made against at least two defendants were 
factually incorrect. 176 
169. Id. at 21. 
170. Id. at 22. 
171. 862 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1988). 
172. Id. at 88. 
173. Id. at 86. 
174. Id. 
175. See id. at 87. 
176. See id. 
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In order to prevail in an appeal from the imposition of Rule 
11 sanctions, an appellant "must show that the district court 
abused its discretion in finding that his conduct was not rea-
sonable under the circumstances. "177 The Sixth Circuit in Davis 
conceded that striking the balance between vigorous advocacy 
and exploitive lawyering is a delicate task, but exhorted district 
court judges to exercise judicious restraint in the imposition 
of Rule 11 sanctions, lest they chill creativity.178 Without de-
ciding whether Younger and its progeny required dismissal of 
the complaint, the Sixth Circuit concluded that there was room 
for reasonable disagreement as to whether abstenti9n was re-
quired under the circumstances presented here.179 Similarly, the 
Sixth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs and their lawyers had 
not failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts on 
which the lawsuit was based. 180 "To uphold the district court's 
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions in the instant case," the court 
stated, "would operate to chill the bringing of facially valid 
civil rights suits in federal court, a consequence that Rule 11 
was never intended to promote." 181 
In the third Rule 11 decision, Jackson v. The Law Firm oj 
O'Hara, Ruberg, Osborne & Taylor,182 the Sixth Circuit upheld 
the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions for failure to make an 
adequate factual investigation prior to filing a legal malpractice 
action. Plaintiff Jackson sued the defendant law firm for alleged 
malpractice arising from its earlier representation of him. An 
investigation of docket sheets and other court records would 
have revealed, or at least put the plaintiff's lawyer on inquiry 
notice, that the law firm did not represent the plaintiff in a 
wrongful death action. 183 In upholding the Rule 11 sanction, 
the Sixth Circuit stated that, although Rule 11 's twin goals 
are deterrence and compensation, its principal goal is to deter. 184 
177. Century Products, Inc. v. Sutter, 837 F.2d 247, 250 (6th Cir. 1988) (citations 
omitted). 
178. 862 F.2d at 89. 
179. [d. at 90. 
180. [d. at 91. 
181. [d. at 92. 
182. 875 F.2d 1224 (6th Cir. 1989). 
183. [d. at 1228. 
184. [d. at 1229. 
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Therefore, "courts should impose the least severe sanction that 
is likely to deter. "18S Thus, for the first time, the Sixth Circuit 
imposed a requirement on the district courts to make some 
inquiry as to an attorney's ability to pay a monetary sanction. 186 
The Sixth Circuit added that the Rule 11 movant has a duty 
to mitigate by bringing the Rule 11 violation promptly to the 
court's attention: "It is an abuse of discretion to award all 
fees claimed when a party has expended a great deal of time 
and effort defending patently frivolous claims that could have 
been dismissed on motion or request for a pretrial conference 
at an early stage in the proceedings." 187 
The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that the 
plaintiff's attorney violated Rule 11 by failing to make a 
reasonable factual and legal inquiry before filing the malpractice 
complaint, and by signing papers subsequently filed in an 
attempt to argue the viability of the malpractice action. 188 As 
to the appropriateness of the $40,000 Rule 11 fee award, the 
Sixth Circuit remanded for consideration of, inter alia, the 
plaintiff's attorney's ability to pay the sanction, directing the 
district court to make a specific finding in that regard and 
adding that "full recovery for reasonable time and expenses 
incurred by the offended party is not invariably required." 189 
The Sixth Circuit's emphasis on the deterrent function of 
Rule 11 is noteworthy. Deterrence may be difficult to achieve, 
however, in cases (1) where the offending attorney has com-
mitted a Rule 11 violation that has cost the adverse party little 
in terms of time and money, and (2) where the offending 
attorney, or his client, is wealthy. May a court impose a Rule 
11 sanction that exceeds the actual expenses incurred by the 
innocent party in defending against the offending litigation? 
The Sixth Circuit raised the issue in Jackson,l90 recognizing 
"that imposing monetary sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 above 
a defendant's actual litigation costs may be construed as a 
185. [d. 
186. [d. at 1230. 
187. [d. at 1230. 
188. [d. at 1231. 
189. [d. at 1232. 
190. [d. 
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fine imposed for criminal contempt. "191 The court suggested 
that such a Rule 11 sanction would not be prohibited per se, 
but that in such a case, greater due process safeguards might 
be applicable. 192 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
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